Since China's merger control regime under the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) was established in 2008, the enforcement record has given rise to growing concern that the system is inherently biased against foreign multinationals. This article conducts an analysis of the evolution of China's merger review system to assess this charge and its implications. China's steady economic development fueled by foreign investment has led to a domestic market featuring strong foreign presence.
Introduction
Since China began to implement the Reform and Opening-Up Policy in 1978, it has engaged in an unprecedented undertaking of overhauling its legal system in order to facilitate and adapt to its stellar economic growth. Of the large number of changes and developments that have taken place in this area, the merger review system is a rather recent addition to China's legal infrastructure. In 2003 the
Provisional Regulations on Mergers with and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by
Foreign Investors ("Provisional M&A Regulations") was adopted, containing in it a nascent antitrust mechanism to regulate only those M&As by and between foreign investors.
2 It was not until the Anti-Monopoly Law ("AML") 3 entered into force in August 2008 , that China introduced a fully-fledged merger control regime that applies generally to both foreign and Chinese companies 4 .
From the beginning of its brief existence under the AML, however, China's merger review regime has been subject to close scrutiny and extensive debate. To a large extent this reflects the enormous interest in the AML generally, which, after 13 strenuous years of efforts to draft, is hailed as a significant landmark in China's gradual transition from central planning to a market economy. Merger review, together with provisions prohibiting cartels and abuse of dominant market position, constitute the three basic "pillars" of the AML. But more importantly, wide-spread public attention has been caused because authorities have taken an activist approach to merger enforcement that seemingly target foreign investors in particular.
During two years after the merger review system was established under the AML, the enforcement agency approved six mergers subject to restrictive conditions and blocked one merger, all of which involved foreign multinational companies.
In developed market economies such as the U.S., antitrust regimes including merger review systems were established to address competition issues in a market composed almost exclusively of domestic firms. In contrast, under the bro-| 139 Prismas: Dir., Pol. Publ. e Mundial., Brasília, v. 7, n. 2, p. 137-160, jul./dez. 2010 China's merger control regime in the face of global Integration: features ... ad context of globalization and after more than two decades of rapid economic development fueled by international trade and foreign investment, China had very different market conditions and competition landscape when its first merger control legislation was adopted. Foreign dominance in many sectors posed formidable competitive threat to Chinese firms, while the government had long prioritized the expansion of domestic companies, especially the State-Owned-Enterprises ("SOEs"). Inevitably a major concern for the Chinese authorities is the foreign--domestic competition, which has remained an underlying policy issue during the entire development of China's merger control system.
This article explores the features of China's merger control regime and assesses its implications, in light of China's integration with the world economy in the period of globalization. It reviews the historical background when the merger review component was first conceived, explains the early legislation of the merger review system, and provides an analysis of the existing merger review regime and law enforcement activities.
Background: the globalization impetus
China's accession to the WTO in 2001 started a new era for its integration into the rest of the world economy. As China's market opened up further to the world, a legitimate concern arose about whether Chinese companies could compete with foreign firms, and whether China's many fledging industries could fare well or even survive.
At the time, most Chinese business entities were still small and weak. Even
China's large, industrial companies were relatively small when put in the context of the global market. which China prepared itself to use fully whenever possible. 14 The envisioned anti--monopoly law, with fundamental and far-reaching implications for competition and market order, had thus become a top priority on the legislative agenda.
3 The embryonic stage: wariness toward foreign acquirers Despite of such a modest start in terms of legislation, the four articles by themselves constituted a sufficiently operational merger control regime that was shortly put into implementation. Notably this scheme was largely independent 13 The three regulations were adopted on 31 oct. (4) as a result of the transaction, the market share of one party reaches 25% in China. In addition, even if those thresholds were not met, whenever the enforcement agencies considered it necessary due to concerns of large markets share, market competition or national economic security, they had the power to request notification by the foreign investors.
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("Filing Guideline") with detailed procedural requirements. 22 Although the Filing Guideline was not legally binding in nature, it provided much-needed guidance and predictability for notifying parties and in practice was generally followed.
The major weakness of this merger control system is the lack of enforcement power possessed by the agencies. The regulation itself was silent as to liabilities for failing to notify a reportable transaction or non-compliance with a decision by the agencies to block a deal. 
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Upon the receipt of a complete notification pursuant to Articles 23 and 24, MOFCOM initiates a 30-day preliminary review. 32 If the agency decides that further review is warranted, the investigation will move into second stage, subject to a time limit of 90 days and a possible extension of up to another 60 days. 33 In conducting substantive evaluation of the merger, the following factors should considered:
(1) market shares of parties and their controlling power over the market; (2) the degree of market concentration; (3) the impact of the concentration on market access and technological progress; (4) the impact of the concentration on consumers and other undertakings; (5) the impact of the concentration on national economic development; and (6) other elements that affect competition and should be taken into account. The AML makes clear that after its assessment of the merger the enforcement agency can take a decision to clear a merger, to conditionally approve a merger or to prohibit a merger. 35 Decisions prohibiting a merger or attaching restriction conditions to a merger should be published in a timely manner.
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Legal liabilities for violations of the merger review provisions under the AML are specified. If a merger is implemented in violation of the law, the enforcement agency shall order the parties to cease the implementation of the transaction, order the divestment of the shares or assets or the transfer of business operations within a given time limit, and take other measures necessary to restore the conditions prevailing before the closing. In addition, it may impose a fine of up to RMB 500,000. 
Cases
Since the AML merger control regime was established in August 2008, MO-FCOM has taken an activist approach to merger enforcement. During a period of two years, the enforcement agency approved six mergers subject to restrictive conditions and blocked one merger. The seven decisions, all published pursuant to AML requirement, bear strong testimony to the increased enforceability of the merger review regime compared to the previous system, most importantly due to the introduction of provisions on the decisions MOFCOM can take and legal liabilities for violations.
However, although the AML merger review no longer limits its application to only transactions involving foreign acquirers, actual enforcement activities seems to suggest that those are still the foremost concern of the Chinese authorities. Interview") 40 , are that the merger does not eliminate or restrict competition in the Chinese beer market. 41 In other words, as a threshold issue, no harm to competition is identified in this case. Rather, the authorities are concerned about possible "future" harm that may materialize only upon further expansion of the merged firm through increase of control in China's major beer manufacturers. It is explained that MOFCOM considers those restrictive conditions necessary to pre-empt the potential emergence of anticompetitive market structure as a result of the merger. 42 If increase of market share alone is taken as the negative effect on competition, it is inconsistent with MOFCOM's view that growth of company in itself is not considered anticompetitive. 43 Implicitly, anticompetitive market structure here refers to one in which the growth of foreign companies squeeze out domestic competitors.
Coca Cola/Huiyuan
On March 18, 2009, MOFCOM announced its decision to reject the proposed bid by Coca Cola Corp of the entire shares of Huiyuan Juice Group, the largest juice maker and a household brand in China. 44 Among the seven cases, this is the only one that involves a contemplated takeover by a foreign company of a Chinese firm, and so far it remains the only merger that has been blocked by MOFCOM.
MOFCOM's decision was based on affirmative findings of negative effects that the merger would cause. Firstly, it was concerned that the acquisition of Huiyuan would enable Coca Cola to leverage its dominant position in the carbonated soft drinks market into the juice beverage market. Secondly, the control of two well-known brands ("Minute Maid" and "Huiyuan"), in addition to Coca Cola's dominant position and the leverage effect, would raise entry barriers to the juice beverage market to potential competitors. Thirdly, the acquisition would squeeze out smaller juice manufactures in China, restrain the abilities of local producers to participate in competition and innovation in the juice market, and therefore harm the competition in the Chinese juice beverage market and undermine its sustained and healthy development.
Although the decision refers to "consumer welfare" and "entry barrier", it elaborates more on concerns relating to domestic firms in its reasoning. Although remedy proposals had been first discussed, eventually none were accepted by MO-FCOM as sufficient to address those identified concerns.
Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite
On April 24, 2009, MOFCOM announced its decision to conditionally approve Japanese chemical giant Mitsubishi Rayon's planned purchase of British--based Lucite. 45 According to the decision, the proposed transaction would give the merged entity a combined share of 64% in the Chinese methyl methacrylate ("MMA") market, significantly larger than those of its competitors. MOFCOM was concerned that the dominant position would enable the merged firm to eliminate or restrict competitors in China's MMA market. In addition, as Mitsubishi Rayon also operates in two downstream markets of MMA, the dominance in the MMA market would likely cause foreclosure effects and restrict access to MMA by downstream competitors of the merged entity.
To address those concerns, MOFCOM decided to impose certain conditions, including: Lucite's Chinese subsidiary, Lucite China is required to divest 50% of its annual MMA production capacity for five years; the China operations of Lucite China's and Mitsubishi Rayon's MMA businesses must be managed separately, from the closing of the proposed transaction to the completion of the divestiture;
and for five years from the closing of the transaction, the merged entity may not acquire producers or build new plants in China that manufacture MMA monomer, PMMA polymer, or cast sheet products, absent MOFCOM's prior approval.
In contrast to the InBev/Anheuser-Busch case, this decision is based on affirmative findings of adverse effects of the merger on competition in the Chinese market. However, the decision offers no explanation about how the imposed conditions, for example the divestiture of 50% of Lucite China's production capacity for a period of five years, can "adequately cure" 46 the anticompetitive impact of the transaction. As with the InBev/Anheuser-Busch decision, it also seeks to control future strategic activities by the merged entity. The effects of those conditions appear to be similar to that of InBev/Anheuser-Busch, that is, to restrict the growth of foreign competitors. Only that in this case the restriction has a term of five years.
GM/Delphi
On September 28, 2009, MOFCOM conditionally approved the proposed acquisition of Delphi by General Motors ("GM"), a transaction involving two U.S. Delphi will assist in the smooth switching of suppliers by its customers; and GM must continue to procure auto parts from multiple sources on a non-discriminatory basis and must not unreasonably favor Delphi over its competitors.
Car manufacturing in China is a protected industry dominated by SOEs and foreign shareholding in any joint venture in this industry cannot exceed 50%.
The decision clearly attempts to protect domestic automakers against any potential anticompetitive behavior by the merger entity.
Pfizer/Wyeth
On September 29, 2009, a fourth clearance decision was delivered concerning a transaction between two U.S. pharmaceutical companies, the proposed acquisition of Wyeth by Pfizer. 49 MOFCOM concluded that the merger would raise required to find independent buyers for those assets to be divested, and must find the qualified purchasers within six months upon MOFCOM's approval, with a possible extension for another six months, again subject to MOFCOM's approval. In addition, Panasonic committed to reducing its shareholding in a Panasonic-Toyota joint venture from 40% to 19.5% and relinquish certain management rights in the joint venture.
Unlike the previous decisions, in which the relevant geographical market is explicitly or implicitly defined as the Chinese market, this case set the analysis in the context of the world market, and most of the businesses to be divested in this case are in Japan. It does not specify to what degree the proposed transaction would negatively affect the Chinese market and how the restrictive conditions will remedy it.
Novartis/Alcon
On August 13, 2010, MOFCOM conditionally approved the proposed acquisition by Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis of Alcon, a global medical company specializing in eye care products that is also incorporated in Switzerland.
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MOFCOM found that the transaction may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition in ophthalmic anti-inflammatory/anti-infective compounds market and contact lens care markets, due to high or leading combined market shares. To address those concerns, MOFCOM and the notifying parties agreed on two remedy measures, that Novartis is required to cease sales of its own anti-inflammatory/anti-infective compounds products in China by the end of 2010 and the restriction will last for 5 years from the date of the decision; and Novartis must terminate its strategic partnership with Haicheng, which has the biggest market share of contact lens care products in China, within 12 months of the decision.
One official explanation is that the percentage of notifications involving multinationals is large because their annual turnover is sufficiently high to meet the filing thresholds. 55 While it is true that foreign companies have an oversized presence in many sectors, for the antitrust authorities this seems to pose more a threat to the growth of Chinese firms rather than to market competition. This is not only evidenced by the two-year AML enforcement record, with the arguably small sample of seven decisions, but by the existence of a preceding merger review system established in 2003 that only applied to foreign acquisitions.
Even assuming that all the seven decisions have been taken on valid competition grounds, the fact that not one M&A between Chinese firms has been the subject of adverse decision might bear testimony to the underenforcement of the current merger control regime. Over a hundred of "national champion" firms have grown substantially as a result of massive restructuring such as M&As in the most important industries that the state still monopolizes. 56 Given that the number of mergers between Chinese firms notified to MOFCOM is not publicly known, it is hard to assess the agency's approach. But some of those transactions that meet the mandatory notification requirement are not even notified to MOFCOM. A particularly notable case in this category is the merger between China Unicom and China Netcom in October 2008, two of China's leading telecommunications companies. 57 In this context, the more effectively the merger control rules are applied to foreign companies, the more the system is skewed in favour of domestic firms, especially the SOEs.
In summary, from its inception, China's merger control regime has been shaped by considerations and priorities unique to its stage of economic development. As a large emerging economy, China has benefited tremendously from foreign investment over three decades, which at the same time contributed to a market structure in which foreign companies dominates many sectors vis-à-vis fledging local firms. Chinese authorities appear to have first designed a merger review system specifically to address this concern and subsequently applied neutral AML provisions more aggressively to foreign multinationals. This obviously is not only of great concern to foreign investors interested in China's market, but also will have significant long-term impact on China's evolving antitrust law, the overall legal system, economic development and further integration with the world. 
